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Abstract
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private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We
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Introduction

The seminal analysis of second price auctions by Vickrey (1961) established that single or
multiple unit discriminatory auctions can be used to implement the socially e cient allocation in private value models in (weakly) dominant strategies. The subsequent contributions
by Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) showed that the insight of Vickrey extends to general
allocation problems in private value environments. The central idea behind the VickreyClarke-Groves mechanism is to convert the indirect utility of each agent i into the social
objective function - up to a term which is a constant from the point of view of agent i. In
the class of transfer payments which accomplish this internalization of the social objective,
the pivot mechanism (due to Green and La ont (1977)) requires the transfer payment of
agent i to match her externality cost on the remaining agents . The resulting net utility for
agent i corresponds to her marginal contribution to the social value.
In this paper, we generalize the idea of a marginal contribution mechanism (or the pivot
mechanism) to dynamic environments with private information. We design an intertemporal sequence of transfer payments which allows each agent to receive her ow marginal
contribution in every period. In other words, after each history, the expected transfer that
each player must pay coincides with the dynamic externality cost that she imposes on other
agents. In consequence, each agent is willing to truthfully report her information in every
period.
We consider a general intertemporal model in discrete time and with a common discount
factor. The private information of each agent in each period is her perception of her future
payo path conditional on the realized information and allocations. We assume throughout
that the information that the agents have is statistically independent across agents. At the
reporting stage of the direct mechanism, each agent reports her information. The planner
then calculates the e cient allocation given the reported information. The planner also
calculates for each i the optimal allocation when agent i is excluded from the mechanism.
The total expected discounted payment of each agent is set equal to the externality cost
imposed on the other agents in the model. In this manner, each player receives as her
payment her marginal contribution to the social welfare in every conceivable continuation
mechanism.
With transferable utilities, the social objective is simply to maximize the expected dis-
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counted sum of the individual utilities. Since this is essentially a dynamic programming
problem, the solution is by construction time consistent. In consequence, the dynamic
marginal contribution mechanism is time consistent and the social choice function can be
implemented by a sequential mechanism without any ex ante commitment by the designer.
In contrast, in revenue maximizing problems, the \ratchet e ect" leads to very distinct
solutions for mechanisms with and without intertemporal commitment ability (see Freixas,
Guesnerie, and Tirole (1985)). Furthermore since marginal contributions are positive by
de nition, dynamic marginal contribution mechanism induces all productive agents to participate in the mechanism after all histories.
In contrast to the static environment, the thruthtelling strategy in the dynamic setting
forms an ex-post equilibrium rather than an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies. The
weakening of the equilibrium notion is due to the dynamic nature of the game. The reports
of other agents in period t determine the allocation for that period. In the dynamic game,
the agents' intertemporal payo s depend on the expected future allocations and transfers as
well. As a result, the agents' current reports need not maximize their current payo . Since
dishonest reports distort current and future allocations in di erent ways, agent i0 s optimal
report may depend on the reports of others. Nevertheless, truthful reporting is optimal for
all realizations of other players' private information as long as their reports are truthful.
In the intertemporal environment there is a multiplicity in transfer schemes that support
the same incentives as the marginal contribution mechanism. In particular, the monetary
transfers necessary to induce the e cient action in period t may always become due at some
later period s, provided that the transfers maintain a constant net present value. We say
that a mechanism supports e cient exit if an agent who ceases to a ect the current and
future allocations also ceases to receive transfers. Our second characterization result shows
that the marginal contribution mechanism is the unique mechanism that satis es ex post
incentive, ex post participation and e cient exit conditions.
The basic idea of the marginal contribution mechanism is rst explored in the context
of a scheduling problem where a set of privately informed bidders compete for the services
of a central facility over time. This class of problems is perhaps the most natural dynamic
analogue of static single unit auctions. Besides the direct revelation mechanism, we also
show that there is dynamic ascending price auction implements the e cient allocation when
each bidder has a single task that can be completed in a single period. Unfortunately in the
3

case of multiple tasks per bidder, the ascending price auction and other standard auction
formats fail to be e cient. In contrast, the marginal contribution mechanism continues
to support the e cient allocation. This gap calls for a more complete understanding of
bidding mechanisms expressible in the willingness to pay in intertemporal environments.
In section 5, we use the marginal contribution mechanism to derive the optimal dynamic
auction format for a model where bidders learn their valuations for a single object over time.
The Bayesian learning framework constitutes a natural setting to analyze the repeated
allocation of an object or a license over time. The key assumption in the learning setting
is that only the current winner gains additional information about her valuation of the
object. If we think about the object as a license to use a facility or to explore a resource for
a limited time, it is natural to assume that the current insider gains information relative to
the outsiders. A conceptual advantage of the sequential allocation problem, often referred
to as multi-armed bandit problem, is that the structure of the socially e cient program
is well understood. As the monetary transfers allow each agent to capture her marginal
contribution, the properties of the social program translate into properties of the marginal
program. In the case of the dynamic auction, we therefore obtain surprisingly explicit and
informative expressions for the intertemporal transfer prices.
In recent years, a number of papers have been written with the aim to explore various
issues arising in dynamic allocation problems. Athey and Segal (2007b) consider a similar
model as ours. Their focus is on mechanisms that are budget balanced whereas our paper
focuses on mechanisms where the participation constraint is satis ed in each period. In
the last section of their paper, Athey and Segal (2007b) show that in in nite horizon problems, participation constraint can be satis ed using repeated game strategies if the discount
factors are high enough. The same repeated game strategies are employed by Athey and
Segal (2007a) with a focus on repeated bilateral trade. In contrast, we design a sequence
of transfers which support the ow marginal contribution as the net utility of each agent
in every period. In consequence our results work equally well for the nite horizon model
as for the in nite one. Cavallo, Parkes, and Singh (2006) consider a dynamic Markovian
model and derive a sequence of Groves like payments which guarantee interim incentive
compatibility but not interim participation constraints. Bapna and Weber (2005) consider
a sequential allocation problem for a single, indivisible object by a dynamic auction. The
basic optimization problem is a multi-armed bandit problem as in the auction we discuss
4

here. Their analysis attempts to use the Gittins index of each alternative allocation as
a su cient statistic for the determination of the transfer price. While the Gittins index
is su cient to determine the e cient allocation in each period, the indices, in particular
the second highest index is typically not a su cient statistic for the incentive compatible
transfer price. Bapna and Weber (2005) present necessary and su cient conditions when
an a ne but report-contingent combination of indices can represent the externality cost.
In contrast, we consider a direct mechanism and determine the transfers from general principles of the incentive problem. In particular we do not require any assumptions beyond
the private value environment and transferable utility. Friedman and Parkes (2003) and
Parkes and Singh (2003) consider a speci c dynamic environments with randomly arriving
and departing agents in a nite horizon model. A dynamic version of the VCG mechanism,
termed \delayed VCG" is suggested to guarantee interim incentive compatibility but again
does not address interim participation constraints. In symmetric information environments,
Bergemann and V•alim•aki (2003), (2006) use the notion of marginal contribution to construct e cient equilibria in dynamic rst price auctions. In this paper, we emphasize the
role of a time-consistent utility ow, namely the ow marginal contribution, to encompass
environments with private information.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the general model, introduces the
notion of a dynamic mechanism and de nes the equilibrium concept. Section 3 introduces
the main concepts in a simple example. Section 4 analyzes the marginal contribution mechanism in the general environment. We also show that the marginal contribution mechanism
is the unique dynamic mechanism which satis es ex post incentive compatibility, ex post
participation and e cient exit condition. Section 5 analyzes the implications of the general
model for a licensing auction with learning. Section 6 concludes.

5

2

Model

Payo s We consider an environment with private and independent values in a discrete
time, in nite horizon model.

The

ow utility of agent i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig in period t 2

f0; 1; 2; ::::g is determined by the past and present allocations and a monetary transfer.
The allocation space At in period t is assumed to be a compact space and an element of the
allocation space is denoted by at 2 At . An allocation pro le until period t is denoted by:
at = (a0 ; a1 ; :::; at ) 2 At =

t
s=0

As :

The allocation pro le at gives rise to a ow utility ! i;t :
! i;t : At ! R+ ;
and we assume that the ow payo in t is quasi-linear in the transfer pi;t and given by:
! i;t at + pi;t .
By allowing the ow utility ! i;t of agent i in period t to depend on the past allocations, the
model can encompass learning-by-doing and habit formation.1
All agents discount the future with a common discount factor ; 0 <

< 1.

Information The family of ow payo s of agent i over time
f! i;t ( )g1
t=0
is a stochastic process which is privately observed by agent i. In an incomplete information
environment, the private information of agent i in period t is her information about her
current (and future) valuation pro le. The type of agent i in period t is therefore simply her
information about her current (and future) valuation pro le. It is convenient to model the
private information of agent i in period t about his current and future valuations as being
represented by a ltration fFi;t g1
t=0 on a probability space (
sample space
i

i

i ; Fi ; Pi ).

An element ! i of the

is the in nite sequence of valuation functions ! i = (! i;0 ; ! i;1 ; :::) : We take

to be the set of all in nite sequences of uniformly bounded and continuous functions.
1

An alternative (and largely equivalent) approach would allow the past consumption to in uence the

distribution of future random utility.
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In other words, there exists K > 0 such for all i, all t and all at , ! i;t at is continuous
in at and ! i;t at < K. The
the sample space

i

and Pi is the probability measure on

increasing family of sub
about ! i 2

i

-algebra Fi represents the family of measurable events in
i.

The ltration fFi;t g1
t=0 is an

algebras of Fi . Intuitively, the ltration Fi;t is the information

available to agent i at time t. We follow the usual convention to augment

the ltration Fi;t by all subsets of zero probability of Fi . We denote a typical element of
the ltration Fi;t in period t by

! ti 2 Fi;t :

The element ! ti 2 Fi;t thus represents the information of agent i about her current and
future valuations function (! i;t ; ! i;t+1 ; :::) at time t.2 We observe that the information

model is su ciently rich to accommodate random entry and exit of the agents over time. In
particular, for any k 2 N, the rst k utility functions or all but the rst k utility functions
can be equal to zero utilities.
Finally, in the dynamic model, the independent value condition is guaranteed by assuming that the prior probabilities Pi and the ltrations Fi;t are independent across i.
Histories

In the presence of private information we have to distinguish between private

and public histories. The private history of agent i in period t is the sequence of private
information received by agent i until period t, or hi;t = ! 0i ; :::; ! ti

1

: The set of possible

private histories in period t is denoted by Hi;t . In the dynamic direct mechanism to be
de ned shortly, each agent i is asked to report her current information in every period t.
The report ri;t of agent i, truthful or not, is an element of the ltration Fi;t for every t.
The public history in period t is then a sequence of reports until t and allocative decisions
until period t

1, or ht = (r0 ; a0 ; r1 ; a1 ; :::rt

1 ; at 1 ; rt ),

where each rs = (r1;s ; :::; rI;s ) is a

report pro le of the I agents. The set of possible public histories in period t is denoted by
Ht . The sequence of reports by the agents is part of the public history and hence the past
and current reports of the agents are observable to each one of the agents.
2

An common alternative model of private values in static (and dynamic models) is to assign each indi-

vidual a utility function ui (a; ! i ) which depends on the allocation and a privately observed random variable
! i . In our speci cation, we take the utility function itself to be a random function. This direct approach
via random utilities is useful for the characterization results in Theorem 1 and 2.
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Mechanism

A dynamic direct mechanism asks every agent i to report her information

! ti in every period t. The report ri;t , truthful or not, is an element of the ltration Fi;t
for every i and every t. A dynamic direct mechanism is then represented by a family of
allocative decisions:
at : Ht !

(At ) ;

and monetary transfer decisions:
pt : H t ! R I ;
such that the decisions in period t respond to the reported information of all agents in
period t. A dynamic direct mechanism M is then de ned by
1
1
M = ffHt g1
t=0 ; fat gt=0 ; fpt gt=0 g
1
such that the decisions fat ; pt g1
t=0 are adapted to the histories fHt gt=0 .

Social E ciency In an environment with quasi-linear utility the socially e cient policy
is obtained by maximizing the utilitarian welfare criterion, namely the expected discounted
sum of valuations. Given a history ht in period t under truthful reporting, the socially
optimal program can be written simply as
(1
X
W (ht ) = max
E
1
fas gs=t

s=t

s t

I
X

s

)

! i;s (a ) :

i=1

Alternatively, we can represent the social program in its recursive form:
( I
)
X
W (ht ) = max E
! i;t at + EW (ht ; at ) ;
at

i=1

where W (ht ; at ) represents the optimal continuation value conditional upon history ht and
allocation at . We note that the optimal continuation value W (ht ; at ) is well de ned for all
feasible allocations at 2 At The socially e cient policy is denoted by a = fat g1
t=0 . In the
remainder of the paper we focus attention on direct mechanisms which truthfully implement
the socially e cient policy a .
The social externality cost of agent i is determined by the optimal continuation plan in
the absence of agent i. It is therefore useful to de ne the value of the social program after
removing agent i from the set of agents:
W

i (ht )

= max
E
1
fas gs=t

1
X
s=t

8

s t

X
j6=i

! i;s (as ) :

The marginal contribution Mi (ht ) of agent i at history ht is naturally de ned by:
Mi (ht ) , W (ht )

W

i (ht ) :

(1)

The marginal contribution is the change in social value due to the addition of agent i.
Equilibrium In a dynamic direct mechanism, a reporting strategy for agent i in period
t is a mapping from the private and public history into the ltration Fi;t :
ri;t : Hi;t

Ht

1

! Fi;t .

Each agent i reports her information on the current and future valuation process that she
has gathered up to period t: In a dynamic direct mechanism, a reporting strategy for agent
i in period t is simply a mapping from the private and public history into an element of the
ltration Fi;t in period t:
ri;t : Hi;t

Ht

1

! Fi;t .

In other words, each agent i reports her information on her entire valuation process that she
has gathered up to period t: For a given mechanism M, the expected payo for agent i from
reporting strategy ri = fri;t g1
t=0 given that the others agents are reporting r
is given by
E

1
X

t

! i;t at (ht

1 ; ri;t ; r i;t )

+ pi;t (ht

1 ; ri;t ; r i;t )

i

= fr

1
i;t gt=0

:

t=0

Given the mechanism M and the reporting strategies r i , the optimal reporting strategy
of bidder i solves a sequential optimization problem which can be phrased recursively in
terms of value functions, or
Vi (ht

1 ; hi;t )

= max E ! i;t at (ht
ri;t 2Fi;t

1 ; ri;t ; r i;t )

+ pi;t (ht

The pro le of allocative decisions at (ht

1 ; ri;t ; r i;t )

as it includes the past choices (a0 ; :::at

1)

history ht

1

1 ; ri;t ; r i;t )

+ Vi (ht ; at ; hi;t+1 ) :

is determined by the past history ht

1

and the current choice at is determined by the

and the current reports rt . The value function Vi (ht ; at ; hi;t+1 ) represents the

continuation value given the current history ht , the current action at and tomorrow's private
history hi;t+1 . We say that a dynamic direct mechanism M is interim incentive compatible,
if for every agent and every period, truthtelling is a best response given that all other agents
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report truthfully. In terms of the value function, it means that a solution to the dynamic
programming equations is to report truthfully ri;t = ! ti :
! ti 2 arg max E ! i;t at ht

t
1 ; ri;t ; ! i

ri;t 2Fi;t

+ pi;t ht

t
1 ; ri;t ; ! i

+ Vi (ht ; at ; hi;t+1 ) :

We say that M is periodic ex post incentive compatible if truthtelling is a best response
regardless of the signal realization of the other agents:
! ti 2 arg max ! i;t at ht
ri;t 2Fi;t

for all ! t i 2 F

i;t .

t
1 ; ri;t ; ! i

+ pi;t ri;t ; ! t

i

+ EVi (ht ; at ; hi;t+1 ) ;

In the dynamic context, the notion of ex post incentive compatibility

has to be quali ed by periodic as it is ex post with respect to all signals received in period t,
but not ex post with respect to signals arriving after period t. The periodic quali cation is
natural in the dynamic environment as agent i may receive information at some later time
s > t such that in retrospect she would wish to change the allocation choice in t and hence
her report in t.
Finally we consider the interim participation constraint of each agent. If agent i were to
irrevocably leave the mechanism in period t, then an e cient mechanism would prescribe
the e cient policy a

for the remaining agents. By leaving the mechanism, agent i may

i

still enjoy the value of allocative decisions supported by the remaining agents. We de ne
the value of agent i from being outside the mechanism as:
Oi (ht

1 ; hi;t )

= max E ! i;t at i (ht
ri;t 2Fi;t

1 ; r i;t )

+ Oi (ht ; a

i;t ; hi;t+1 )

.

By being outside of the mechanism, the value of agent i is generated from the allocative
decision of the remaining agents and naturally agent i neither in uences their decision
nor does she receive monetary payments. The interim participation constraint of agent i
requires that for all ht :
Vi (ht

1 ; hi;t )

Oi (ht

1 ; hi;t ).

Again, we can strengthen the interim participation constraint to periodic ex post participation constraints for all ht and ! t :
! i;t at ht
! i;t at

i

ht

1; !

t

t
1; ! i

+ pi;t ht

1; !

t

+ EOi (ht ; a
10

+ EVi (ht ; at ; hi;t+1 ) n
i;t ; hi;t+1 ) .

The periodic ex post participation constraint requires that for all possible signal pro les of
the remaining agents and induced allocations, agent i would prefer to stay in the mechanism
rather than leave the mechanism. For the remainder of the text we shall refer to periodic
ex post constraints simply as ex post constraints.
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Scheduling: An Example

We begin the analysis with a class of scheduling problems. The scheduling model is kept
deliberately simple to illustrate the insights and results which are then established for
general environments in the subsequent sections.
We consider the problem of allocating time to use a central facility among competing
agents. Each agent has a private valuation for the completion of a task which requires the
use of the central facility. The facility has a capacity constraint and can only complete one
task per period. The cost of delaying any task is given by the discount rate

< 1: The

agents are competing for the right to use the facility at the earliest available time. The
objective of the social planner is to sequence the tasks over time so as to maximize the sum
of the discounted utilities.
We denote by ! i;t at the private valuation for bidder i 2 f1; :::; Ig in period t. The

prior probability over valuation functions f! i;t ( )g1
t=0 is given Pi . An allocation policy in
this setting is a sequence of choices at 2 f0; 1; :::; Ig; where at denotes the bidder chosen in
period t: We allow for at = 0 and hence the possibility that no bidder is selected in t. Each
agent has only one task to complete and the value ! i 2 R+ of the task is constant over time
and independent of the realization time (except for discouting). The utility function ! i;t ( )
for bidder i from an allocation policy at is represented by:
8
< ! if a = i and a 6= i for all s < t,
i
t
s
! i;t at =
: 0 if
otherwise.

(2)

For this scheduling model we nd the marginal contribution of each agent and then derive
the associated marginal contribution mechanism. We also show that a natural indirect
mechanism, a dynamic bidding mechanism, will lead to the e cient scheduling of tasks over
time with the same ow utilities. Finally we extend the scheduling model to allow each
agent to have multiple tasks. In this slightly more general setting, the dynamic bidding

11

mechanism fails to lead to an e cient allocation, but the marginal contribution mechanism
continues to implement the e cient allocation.
Marginal Contribution We determine the marginal contribution of bidder i by comparing the value of the social program with and without i. We can assume without loss of
generality (after relabelling) that the valuations ! i of the agents are ordered with respect
to their identity i:
!1

!I

0:

(3)

With stationary valuations ! i for all i, the optimal policy is clearly given by assigning in
every period the alternative j with the highest remaining valuation, or
at = t + 1, for all t < I.
The descending order of the valuations of the bidders allows us to identify each alternative
i with the time period i + 1 in which it is employed along the e cient path and so:
W (h0 ) =

I
X

t 1

!t.

(4)

t=1

Similarly, the e cient program in the absence of bidder i assigns the bidders in descending
order, but necessarily skips bidder i in the assignment process. In consequence it assign all
bidders after i one period earlier relative to the program with bidder i:
W

i (h0 )

=

i 1
X

t 1

!t +

t=1

I 1
X

t 1

! t+1 :

(5)

t=i

By comparing the social program with and without i, (4) and (5), respectively, we nd
that the assignments for bidders j < i remain unchanged after i is removed, but that each
bidder j > i is allocated the slot one period earlier than in the presence of i. The marginal
contribution of i form the point of view of period 0 is:
Mi (h0 ) = W (h0 )

W

i (h0 ) =

I
X

t 1

(! t

! t+1 ) ;

t=i

and from the point of view of period hi
Mi (hi

1 ) = W (hi

1)

1

W

along the e cient path is
i (hi

1) =

I
X
t=i

12

t 1

(! t

! t+1 ) :

(6)

The social externality cost of agent i is now established in a straightforward manner. At
time t = i

1, i will complete her task and hence realize a gross value of ! i . The immediate

opportunity cost is given by the next highest valuation ! i+1 . But this alone would overstate
the externality cost, because in the presence of i all less valuable tasks will now be realized
one period later. In other words, the insertion of i into the program leads to the realization
of a relatively more valuable task in all subsequent periods The externality cost of agent i
is hence equal to the value of the next valuable task ! i+1 minus the improvement in future
allocations due the delay of all tasks by one period:
pi;t (ht ) =

! i+1 +

I
X

t i

(! t

! t+1 ) .

(7)

t=i+1

Since by construction (see (3)), we have ! t

! t+1

0, it follows that the externality cost

of agent i in the intertemporal framework is less than in the corresponding single allocation
problem where it would be ! i+1 . Consequently, we can rewrite (7) to:
pi;t (ht ) =

(1

)

I
X

t i

! t+1 ,

(8)

t=i

which simply states that the externality cost of agent i is the cost of delay, namely (1

)

imposed on the remaining and less valuable tasks. With the monetary transfers given by
(7), Theorem 1 will formally establish that the marginal contribution mechanism leads to
thruthtelling with ex post incentive and ex post participation constraints.
In the present scheduling model, the relevant private information for all agents arrives
in period t = 0 and by the stationarity assumption is not changing over time. It would
therefore be possible to assign the tasks completely in t = 0 and also assess the appropriate
transfers in t = 0. In this static version of the direct mechanism each bidder reports her value
of the task and the allocation is determined in the order of the reported valuations. The
static VCG mechanism then has a truthful dominant strategy equilibrium if the payments
are set with reference to (8) as:
pi =

(1

)

I
X

t

! t+1 ,

(9)

t=i

which equals the payments in the dynamic directed mechanism appropriately discounted as
the payments are now assessed at t = 0:
13

Dynamic Bidding Mechanism

In this scheduling problem a number of bidders compete

for a scare resource, namely timely access to the central facility. It is then natural to ask
whether the e cient allocation can be realized through a bidding mechanism rather than
a direct revelation mechanism. We nd a dynamic version of the ascending price auction
where the contemporaneous use of the facility is auctioned. As a given task is completed,
the number of e ective bidders decreases by one. We can then use a backwards induction
algorithm to determine the values for the bidders starting from a nal period in which only
a single bidder is left without e ective competition.
Consider then an ascending auction in which all tasks except that of bidder I have been
completed. Along the e cient path, the nal ascending auction will occur at time t = I

1.

Since all other bidders have vanished along the e cient path at this point, bidder I wins the
nal auction at a price equal to zero. By backwards induction, we consider the penultimate
auction in which the only bidders left are I

1 and I. As agent I can anticipate to win the

auction tomorrow even if she were to loose it today, she is willing to bid at most
bI (! I ) = ! I

(! I

0) ;

(10)

namely the net value gained by winning the auction today rather than tomorrow. Naturally,
a similar argument applies to bidder I
I

1, by dropping out of the competition today bidder

1 would get a net present discounted value of ! I

1

and hence her maximal willingness

to pay is given by
bI
Since bI

1 (! I 1 )

1 (! I 1 )

bI (! I ), given ! I

price auction in t = I

= !I

(! I

1

1

0) .

! I , it follows that bidder I

1

1 wins the ascending

2 and receives a net payo :
!I

1

(1

) !I :

We proceed inductively and nd that the maximal bid of bidder I
I

k

k in period t =

1 is given by:
bI

k

(! I

In other words, bidder I

k)

= !I

k

!I

k

bI

(k 1)

!I

(k 1)

(11)

k is willing to bid as much as to be indi erent between being

selected today and being selected tomorrow, when she would be able to realize a net valuation of ! I

k

bI

(k 1) ,

but only tomorrow, and so the net gain from being selected today
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rather than tomorrow is:
!I
The maximal bid of bidder I

(k

!I

k

k

bI

(12)

(k 1)

1) generates the transfer price of bidder I

k and by

solving (11) recursively with the initial condition given by (10), we nd that the price in
the ascending auction equals the externality cost in the direct mechanism given by (8). In
this class of scheduling problems, the e cient allocation can therefore be implemented by
a bidding mechanism.3
Multiple Tasks We end this section with a minor modi cation of the scheduling model
to allow for multiple tasks. For this purpose it will su ce to consider an example with two
bidders. The rst bidder has an in nite series of single period tasks, each delivering a value
of ! 1 . The second bidder has only a single task with a value ! 2 . The utility function of
bidder 1 is thus given by
! 1;t at

8
< ! if a = 1 for all t,
i
t
=
: 0 if
otherwise.

whereas the utility function of bidder 1 is as described earlier by (2).
The socially e cient allocation in this setting either has at = 1 for all t if ! 1
a0 = 2; at = 1 for all t

! 2 or

1 if ! 1 < ! 2 : For the remainder of this example, we will assume

that ! 1 > ! 2 : Under this assumption the e cient policy will never complete the task of
bidder 2. The marginal contribution of each bidder is:
M1 (h0 ) = (! 1

!2) +

1

!1

(13)

and
M2 (h0 ) = 0.
Along any e cient path ht , we have Mi (h0 ) = Mi (ht ) for all i and we compute the social
externality cost of agent 1, p1;t for all t, by using (13):
p1;t =
3

(1

) !2.

The nature of the recursive bidding strategies bears some similarity to the construction of the bidding

strategies for multiple advertising slots in the keyword auction of Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwartz (2007).
In the auction for search keywords, the multiple slots are di erentiated by their probability of receiving a
hit and hence generating a value. In the scheduling model here, the multiple slots are di erentiated by the
time discount associated with di erent access times.

15

The externality cost is again the cost of delay imposed on the competing bidder, namely
(1

) times the valuation of the competing bidder. This accurately represent the social

externality cost of agent 1 in every period even though agent 2 will never receive access to
the facility.
We contrast the e cient allocation and transfer with the allocation resulting in the
dynamic ascending price auction. For this purpose, suppose that the equilibrium path
generated by the dynamic bidding mechanism would be e cient. In this case bidder 2
would never be chosen and hence would receive a net payo

of 0 along the equilibrium

path. But this means that bidder 2 would be willing to bid up to ! 2 in every period. In
consequence the rst bidder would receive a net payo of ! 1

! 2 in every period and her

discounted sum of payo would then be:
1
1

(! 1

! 2 ) < M1 :

(14)

But more important than the failure of the marginal contribution is the fact that the
equilibrium will not support the e cient assignment policy. To see this, notice that if
bidder 1 looses to bidder 2 in any single period, then the task of bidder 2 is completed and
bidder 2 will drop out of the auction in all future stages. Hence the continuation payo for
bidder 1 from dropping out in a given period and allowing bidder 2 to complete his task is
given by:
!1:

1

(15)

If we compare the continuation payo s (14) and (15) respectively, then we see that it is
bene cial for bidder 1 to win the auction in all periods if and only if
!1
but the e ciency condition is simply ! 1

!2
1

;

! 2 . It follows that for a large range of valuations,

the outcome in the ascending auction is ine cient and will assign the object to bidder 2
despite the ine ciency of this assignment. The reason for the ine ciency is easy to detect
in this simple setting. The forward looking bidders consider only their individual net payo s
in future periods. The planner on the other hand is interested in the level of gross payo s
in the future periods. As a result, bidder 1 is strategically willing and able to depress the
future value of bidder 2 by letting bidder 2 win today to increase the future di erence in
the valuations between the two bidders. But from the point of view of the planner, the
16

di erential gains for bidder 1 is immaterial and the assignment to bidder 2 represents an
ine ciency. The rule of the ascending price auction, namely that the highest bidder wins,
only internalizes the individual equilibrium payo s but not the social payo s.
This small extension to multiple tasks shows that the logic of the marginal contribution
mechanism can account for subtle intertemporal changes in the payo s. On the other hand,
common bidding mechanisms may not resolve the dynamic allocation problem in an e cient
manner. Indirectly, it suggests that suitable indirect mechanisms have yet to be devised for
scheduling and other sequential allocation problems.

4

Marginal Contribution Mechanism

In this section we construct the marginal contribution mechanism for the general model
described in Section 2. We show that it is the unique mechanism which guarantees the
ex post incentive constraints, the ex post participation constraints and an e cient exit
condition.

4.1

Characterization

In the static Vickrey auction, the price of the winning bidder is equal to the highest valuation
among the loosing bidders. The highest value among the remaining bidders represents
the social opportunity cost of assigning the object to the winning bidder. The marginal
contribution of agent i is her contribution to the social value. At the same time, it is
the information rent that agent i can secure for herself if the planner wishes to implement
the socially e cient allocation. In a dynamic setting if agent i can secure her marginal
contribution in every continuation game of the mechanism, then she should be able to receive
the

ow marginal contribution mi (ht ) in every period. The

ow marginal contribution

accrues incrementally over time and is de ned recursively:
Mi (ht ) = mi (ht ) + Mi (ht ; at ) :
As in the notations of the value functions, W ( ) and Vi ( ) above, Mi (ht ; at ) represents the
marginal contribution of agent i in the continuation problem conditional on the history ht
and the allocation at today. The ow marginal contribution can be expressed more directly
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using the de nition of the marginal contribution (1) as
mi (ht ) = W (ht )

W

i (ht )

(W (ht ; at )

We can replace the value functions W (ht ) and W

i (ht )

W

i (ht ; at )) .

(16)

by the corresponding ow payo s

and continuation payo s to get the ow marginal contribution of agent i:
mi (ht ) =

X

! j;t at ; at

1

j

X

! j;t a

t 1
i;t ; a

+

W

i (ht ; at )

W

ht ; a

i

i;t

. (17)

j6=i

If the presence of i, leads the designer to adopt the allocation at , then this preempts the
preferred allocation a

i;t

for all agents but i. To the extent that a decision for at irrevocably

changes the value (including continuation value) of the remaining agents, the di erence in
value represents the social externality cost of agent i in period t. It is natural to suggest
that a monetary transfer by agent i such that the resulting ow net utility matches her ow
marginal contribution will lead agent i to dynamically internalize her social externalities,
or
pi;t (ht ) , mi (ht )

! i;t at ; at

1

;

(18)

and inserting (17) into (18) we have the transfer payment of the dynamic marginal contribution mechanism:
pi;t (ht ) =

X

! j;t at ; at

1

+ W

X

i (ht ; at )

j6=i

! j;t a

i;t ; a

t 1

W

i

ht ; a

i;t

: (19)

j6=i

The monetary transfers based on the marginal contribution of each agent i can support the
e cient allocation in the resulting dynamic direct mechanism. We observe that the transfer
pricing (19) for agent i depends on the report of agent i only through the determination
of the social allocation which already appeared as a prominent feature in the static VCG
environment. The monetary transfers pi;t (ht ) are always non-positive as the policy a

i;t

is

by de nition an optimal policy to maximize the social value of all agents exclusive of i. It
follows that in every period t the sum of the monetary transfers across all agents generates
a weak budget surplus. Thus the design of the transfers pi;t guarantees that the designer
does not face a budget de cit in any single period.
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Theorem 1 (Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism)
The dynamic marginal contribution mechanism fat ; pt g1
t=0 is e cient and satis es ex post
incentive and ex post participation constraints for all i and all ht .
Proof. By the unimprovability principle, it su ces to prove that if agent i will receive as
her continuation value her marginal contribution, then truthtelling is incentive compatible
for agent i in period t, or:
! i;t at ; at

1

pi;t ht

t
t
1 ; at 1 ; ! i ; ! i

! i;t at ; at

1

pi;t (ht

1 ; at 1 ; ri;t ; ! i;t )

for all ri;t 2 Fi;t and all !

2 F

i;t

i;t ,

+ Mi (ht ; at )

(20)

+ Mi (ht ; at ) ;

where at is the socially e cient allocation if the
t
t
1 ; at 1 ; ! i ; ! i

report ri;t would be the true information in period t, or at = at ht

. By

construction of the transfer price pi;t ( ) in ( ), the lhs of (20) represents the marginal
contribution of agent i. Similarly, we can express the continuation marginal contribution
Mi (ht ; a) in terms of the values of the di erent social programs to get
W (ht )

W

! i;t at ; at

i (ht )

1

(21)

pi;t (ht

1 ; at 1 ; ri;t ; ! i;t )

+ (W (ht ; at )

W

i (ht ; at )) :

By construction of the transfer price pi;t ( ), we can represent the price that agent i would
have to pay if allocation at were to be chosen in terms of the marginal contribution if the
reported signal ri;t were the true signal received by agent i. We can then insert the transfer
price (19) associated with the history pro le (ht
W (ht )

W

! i;t at ; at

1

1 ; at 1 ; ri;t ; ! i;t )

i (ht )

X

! j;t a

i;t ; a

t 1

W

i

ht ; a

i;t

+

j6=i

X

into (21) to obtain:

! j;t at ; at

1

+ W (ht ; at ) :

j6=i

But now we can reconstitute the entire expression in terms of the social value of the program
with and without agent i and we are lead to the nal inequality:
W (ht )

W

i (ht )

X

! j;t at ; at

1

+ W (ht ; at )

j

where the later is true by the social optimality of at at ht .
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W

i (ht ) ;

Theorem 1 gives a characterization of the monetary transfer. In speci c environments,
as in the earlier scheduling problem or the licensing auction in the next section, we gain
additional insights into the structure of the e cient transfer prices by analyzing how the
policies would change with the addition or removal of an arbitrary agent i.
The design of the transfer price pursued the objective to match the ow marginal contribution of every agent in every period. The determination of the monetary transfer is based
exclusively on the reported signals of the other agents, rather than their true signals. For
this reason, truthtelling is not only Bayesian incentive compatible, but ex post incentive
compatible where ex post refers to reports conditional on all signals received up to and
including period t.
An important insight from the static analysis of the private value environment is the
fact that incentive compatibility can be guaranteed in weakly dominant strategies. This
strong result does not carry over into the dynamic setting due to the interaction of the
strategies. Since the e cient allocation in t + 1 depends on information reported in t; there
is no reason to believe that truthful reporting remains an optimal strategy for an agent
when other agents have misreported their information. It is possible, for example, that
agents other than i report in period t information that results in a negative ow marginal
contribution for i when the e cient allocation is calculated according to this report. If the
reports are not truthful, there is no guarantee that i can recoup period t losses in future
periods. Nevertheless, our argument shows that the weaker condition of ex post incentive
compatibility can be satis ed.

4.2

Uniqueness

The marginal contribution mechanism speci es a unique monetary transfer in every period
and after every history. This mechanism guarantees that the ex post incentive and ex post
participation constraints are satis ed after every history ht , but it is not the only mechanism to satisfy these constraints over time. In the intertemporal environment, each agent
evaluates the monetary transfers to be paid in terms of the expected discounted transfers,
but is indi erent (up to discounting) about the incidence of transfers over time. The natural consequence is a multiplicity of transfer schemes that support the same intertemporal
incentives as the marginal contribution mechanism. In particular, the monetary transfers
necessary to induce the e cient action in period t may always be due to transfers to be paid
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at a later period s, provided that the relevant transfers grow at the required rate of 1= to
maintain a constant net present value. Agent i may therefore be called to make a payment
long after agent i ceased to be important for the mechanism in sense of in uencing current
or future allocative decisions.4
This temporal separation between allocative in uence and monetary payments may be
undesirable for may reasons. First, agent i could be tempted to leave the mechanisms
and break her commitment after she ceases to have a pivotal role but before her payments
come due. Second, if the arrival and departure of the agents were random, then an agent
could falsely claim to depart to avoid future payments. Finally, the designer could wish to
minimize communication cost by eliciting information and payments only from agents who
are pivotal with positive probability. In the intertemporal environment it is then natural
to require that if agent i ceases to in uence current or future allocative decisions in period
t, then she also ceases to have monetary obligations. Formally, for agent i let time

i

be

the rst time such that the e cient social decision as will be una ected by the absence of
agent i for all possible future states of the world, or
i

= min t as (ht ; (at ; ! t+1 ) ; :::; (as

1; !

s

)) = a

i;s

ht ; at ; ! t+1 ; :::; (as

1; !

s

) , 8s

t; 8! s :

We now say that a mechanism satis es the e cient exit condition if the end of economic
in uence coincides with the end of monetary payments.
De nition 1 (E cient Exit)
A dynamic mechanism satis es the e cient exit condition if for all i, ht and
pi;s (hs ) = 0; for all s

i:

i

:
(22)

The e cient exit condition is su cient to uniquely identify the marginal contribution
mechanism among all dynamic mechanism which satis es the ex post incentive and the ex
post participation constraints.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness)
If a dynamic direct mechanism is e cient, satis es the ex post incentive constraints, the
ex post participation constraints and the e cient exit condition, then it is the dynamic
marginal contribution mechanism.
4

We would like to thank an anonymous referee to suggest to us a link between exit and uniqueness of the

transfer rule.
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Proof. We x an arbitrary e cient dynamic mechanism which satis es the ex post incentive, ex post participation and e cient exit conditions with transfer payments fpi;t ( )g1
t=0
for all i. We rst establish that for the given mechanism and for every i, ht
there exists some type ! ti such that the monetary transfer pi;t ht

1 ; at 1 ; !

1 ; at
t

and ! t i ,

for the e -

cient allocation at is equal to the transfer payment (19) under the marginal contribution
mechanism. Consider a type ! ti of the form
! ti = (! i;t ( ) ; 0; 0;:::) .

(23)

In words, type ! ti of agent i has a valuation function ! i;t ( ) today and a valuation of zero for
all allocations beyond period t. By the e cient exit condition, it follows that pi;s ( ) = 0 for
all s > t. Given ! t i , the optimal allocation in the absence of i is given by some a

i;t .

For an

arbitrary allocation at , we can now always nd a utility function ! i;t ( ) with a su ciently
high valuation for at such that at is the socially e cient allocation today, or at = at even
though i will have zero valuations starting from tomorrow. In particular we consider
8
< 0 if a0 6= a ;
t
t
! i;t a0t =
(24)
0
: ! i if a = at ;
t

for some ! i 2 R+ . (We can always nd a continuous approximation of ! i;t ( ) to stay in the

class of continuous utility functions.) Now if ! i 2 R+ is su ciently large so as to outweigh
the social externality cost of imposing at as the e cient allocation, or
X
X
!i >
! j;t a i;t ; at 1
! j;t at ; at 1 + W i ht ; a i;t
W
j6=i

i (ht ; at )

;

j6=i

then at is the e cient allocation in period t. By the e cient exit condition, the ex post
incentive and participation constraints for type ! ti de ned by (23) and (24) reduces to
the static ex post incentive and ex post participation constraints. It now follows that the
transfer payment pi;t (ht ) has to be exactly equal to (19). For, if pi;t (ht ) were smaller than
pi;t (ht ) of (19), then there would be valuations ! i above but close to the social externality
cost such that agent i would nd the transfer payment too large to report truthfully in an
ex post equilibrium. Likewise if the monetary transfer to agent i would be above pi;t (ht ) of
(19), then agent i would have an incentive to induce the allocation at even so it would not
be the socially e cient decision.
Next we argue that for all i, ht , and at , the monetary transfer is equal to or below (19).
Suppose not, i.e. there exists an i and ht such that pi;t is above the value pi;t (ht ) of (19).
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Then by the argument above, we can nd a type of the form (23), who would want to claim
pi;t even though at is not the socially e cient decision.
Finally, we argue that for all i and ht the monetary transfer pi;t (ht ) cannot be below
the value pi;t (ht ) of (19) either. We observe that we already showed that the monetary
transfer pi;t (ht ) in any period will not exceed the value of pi;t (ht ). Thus if in any period t
agent i receives less than indicated by (19), she will not able to recover her loss relative to
the social externality cost (19) in any future period. But in the rst argument we showed
that i always has the possibility, i.e. for all ht and ! t i , to induce the e cient allocation at
with a monetary transfer equal to (19) by reporting a type ! ti of the form (23). It follows
that agent i will never receive less than pi;t (ht ). We thus have shown that the lower and
upper bound of the monetary transfer under ex post incentive and ex post participation
constraints are equal to pi;t (ht ) provided that the e cient exit condition holds.
The uniqueness results uses the richness of the set of current and future utility functions
to uniquely identify the set of transfers which satisfy the e cient exit condition. The
argument begins with the class of types ! ti which cease to be economic in uence after period
t and given by: ! ti = (! i;t ( ) ; 0; 0;:::) : For these types, the incentive and participation
constraints are similar to the corresponding static constraints though the transfer remain
forward looking in the sense that they incorporate information about future utilities of the
other agents. We then show that for these types, the marginal contribution mechanism is
the only e cient mechanism which satis es the ex post incentive, ex post participation and
e cient exit conditions. We can then show that in presence of the marginal contribution
transfers pi;t = pi;t for the above class of types ! ti , the

ow transfers of all types then

have to agree with the marginal contribution transfers. We establish this by rst arguing
that the ow transfers for any type ! t0i cannot be larger than pi;t or else some of the types
! ti = (! i;t ( ) ; 0; 0;:::) would have an incentive to misrepresent. Finally with an upper bound
on the transfers given by the marginal contribution mechanism, it follows that every type
! t0i has to receive the upper bound or else type ! t0i would have an incentive to misreport to
receive a larger ow transfer without a ecting the social decision.

23

5

Learning and Licensing

In this section, we show how our general model can be interpreted as one where the bidders
learn gradually about their preferences for an object that is auctioned repeatedly over time.
We use the insights from the general marginal contribution mechanism to deduce properties
of the e cient allocation mechanism. A primary example of an economic setting that ts
this model is the leasing of a resource or license over time.
In every period t; a single indivisible object can be allocated to a bidder i 2 f1; :::; Ig.
The true valuation of bidder i is given by

i

2

i

= [0; 1]. The prior distribution of

i

is

given by Fi ( i ) and the distributions are independent across bidders. In period 0, bidder i
does not know the realization of

i,

instead she receives an informative signal s0i 2 Si = [0; 1]

about her true value of the object. The signal si is generated by a conditional distribution
function Gi (si j i ). In each subsequent period t, only the winning bidder in period t
receives additional information about her valuation

i

1

in the form of an additional and

conditionally independent signal si;t 2 Si from the same conditional distribution Gi (si j i ).
If bidder i does not win in period t, we assume that she gets no information, and we denote
this by an uninformative signal si;t = ;: Apart from the uninformative signals, si;t is private

information to bidder i.5

In terms of the notation of the general model, ! i;t is the posterior expectation of
conditional on the information revealed in previous periods:
8
< E [ jh ] if
at = i,
i i;t
! i;t at =
:
0
if otherwise.

The type ! ti of agent i is a sequence of posterior expectations of
sti

= (si;0 ; :::; si;t

i

i

generated by Fi and

1) :

Social E ciency The socially optimal assignment over time is a standard multi{armed
bandit problem and the optimal policy is characterized by an index policy (see Gittins
(1989) and Whittle (1982) for a textbook introduction). In particular, we can compute for
every bidder i the Gittins index based exclusively on the information about bidder i. The
5

We describe the arrival of new information as a Bayesian sampling process. The equilibrium character-

ization in Theorem 3 would continue to hold for any stochastic process, possibly non-Markovian, provided
that the signal realizations are independent across agents and that signals only arrive for winning bidders.
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index of bidder i after private history hi;t is the solution to the following optimal stopping
problem:
i (hi;t )

= max E
i

(P

s

ki =0

! i;t+ki at+ki
P
ki
ki =0

)

;

where at+ki denotes the path in which alternative i has been chosen ki times following the
allocation pro le at and where the expectation is taken with respect to the signal realizations
si;t+k : An important property of the index policy is that the index of alternative i can be
computed independent of any information about the other alternatives. In particular, the
index of bidder i remains constant if bidder i does not win the object. The socially e cient
allocation policy a = fat g1
t=0 is to choose in every period a bidder i if:
i (hi;t )

Dynamic Direct Mechanism

j

(hj;t ) for all j:

In the direct dynamic mechanism, we take the

ow

marginal contribution to be the net utility that each bidder should receive in each period t. We construct a transfer price such that under the e cient allocation, each bidder's
net payo coincides with her ow marginal contribution mi (ht ). We also show that this
pricing rule makes truthtelling incentive compatible in the dynamic mechanism.
We consider rst an e cient bidder i following a history ht .and to match her net payo
to her ow marginal contribution, we must have:
mi (ht ) = ! i (hi;t ) + pi (ht ) :

(25)

The remaining bidders, j 6= i, should not receive the object in period t and their transfer
price must o set the ow marginal contribution:
mj (ht ) = pj (ht ) :
We expand the ow marginal contribution in (25) by noting that i is the e cient assignment
and that another bidder, say k, would constitute the e cient assignment in the absence of
bidder i:
mi (ht ) = ! i (hi;t )
In (26), W

i (ht ; i)

and W

i (ht ; k)

! k (hk;t )

(W

i (ht ; i)

W

i (ht ; k)) :

(26)

represent the continuation value of the social program

without i, conditional on the history ht and the current assignment being i or k

i

respec-

tively. We notice that with private values, the continuation value of the social program
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without i but conditional on the object to agent i in period t is simply equal to the value
of the program conditional on ht alone, or
W

i (ht ; i)

=W

i (ht ) :

The additional information generated by the assignment to agent i only pertains to agent
i and hence has no value for the allocation problem once i is removed. We can therefore
rewrite the ow marginal contribution of the winning agent i as:
mi (ht ) = ! i (hi;t )

(1

)W

i (ht ) :

It follows that the transfer price should simply be given by:
pi (ht ) =

(1

)W

i (ht ) ,

(27)

which is the ow social opportunity cost of assigning the object today to agent i:
A similar analysis, based on the ow marginal contribution (26) leads to the determination of the transfer price for the losing bidders. Consider a bidder j who should not get the
object in period t. Her ow utility is clearly zero in period t. Moreover, by the optimality
of the index policy, the removal of alternative j from the set of possible allocations does not
change the optimal assignment today. In consequence, the identity of the winning bidder
does not depend on the presence of alternative j. In other words the e cient assignment
to i will remain e cient after we remove j. As a result the ow marginal contribution of
the loosing bidder is zero, and we have:
pj (ht ) = mj (ht ) = 0.
Our main result in this section collects this information on the transfers in the dynamic
marginal contribution mechanism.
Theorem 3 (Dynamic Second Price Auction)
The socially e cient allocation rule a is ex post incentive compatible in the dynamic direct
mechanism with the payment rule p where:
8
< (1
)W
pj (ht ) =
:
0
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j

(ht )

if at = j;
if at 6= j:

The incentive compatible pricing rule has a few interesting implications. First, we
observe that in the case of two bidders, the formula for the dynamic second price reduces to
the static solution. If we remove one bidder, the social program has no other choice but to
always assign it to the remaining bidder. But then, the expected value of that assignment
policy is simply equal to the expected value of the object for bidder j in period t by the
martingale probability of the Bayesian posterior. In other words, the transfer is equal to
the current expected value of the next best competitor. It should be noted, though, that
the object is not necessarily assigned to the bidder with the highest current ow payo .
With more than two bidders, the ow value of the social program without bidder i is
di erent from the

ow value of any remaining alternative. Since there are at least two

bidders left after excluding i; the planner has the option to abandon any chosen alternative
if its value happens to fall su ciently much. This option value increases the social ow
payo and hence the transfer that the e cient bidder must pay. In consequence the social
opportunity cost is higher than the highest expected valuation among the remaining bidders.
Second, we observe that the transfer price of the winning bidder is independent of her
own information about the object. This means, that for any number of periods in which the
ownership of the object does not change, the transfer price will stay constant as well, even
though the valuation of the object by the winning bidder may undergo substantial change.

6

Conclusion

This paper suggest the construction of a direct dynamic mechanism in private value environments with transferable utility. The design of the monetary transfers relies on the
notions of marginal contribution and ow marginal contribution. These notions allow us to
transfer the insights of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism from a static environment to
intertemporal settings. In the case of the sequential allocation of a single indivisible object,
we show that the notion of marginal contribution and its relationship to the social program
allow us to give explicit solutions of the monetary transfers in each period.
Many interesting questions are left open. Our examples show that the most immediate
generalizations of standard auction formats such as dynamic ascending price auction may
fail to lead to e cient allocations in dynamic models. The direct mechanism calculated
in this paper is straightforward from a theoretical point of view. Nevertheless, in practice
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the designer may wish to nd equivalent bidding mechanisms in which reports are simply
statements about the willingness to pay. The initial scheduling problem points to issue
of de ning and analyzing reasonable or simple auction mechanisms for dynamic allocation
problems.
The dynamic mechanism considered here satis es incentive compatibility and participation constraints with respect to the e cient allocation. It is natural to ask whether the
approach here may yield insights into revenue maximizing problems in dynamic models.
In order to make progress in this direction, a characterization of the set of implementable
dynamic allocations would be necessary. In particular with intertemporal models the signal
space of every agent inherently becomes multidimensional. Finally, we restricted our attention to private value environments. A recent literature, beginning with Maskin (1992) and
Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) showed how to extend the VCG mechanism to interdependent
value environments. In dynamic settings, the single crossing condition will then typically
involve a dynamic element which will introduce some complications. These questions are
left for future research.
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